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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DRUG TESTING THOSE CRAZY CHESS CLUB KIDS: THE
SUPREME COURT TURNS AWAY FROM THE ONE CLEAR PATH
IN THE MAZE OF “SPECIAL NEEDS” JURISPRUDENCE IN
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. EARLS

I. INTRODUCTION
Extracurricular activities serve important functions in contemporary high
schools, as they serve to establish positive social supports and networks, to
teach specific competencies and prosocial values, and to keep children busy so
they do not have as many opportunities to engage in risky activities.1 As a
result of these effects, or because lower risk students tend to engage in these
activities in the first place, students involved in extracurricular activities are
less likely to use drugs, tend to like school, get good grades, and go to college
more often than those that do not participate in extracurricular activities.2
Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent decision of Board of Education v. Earls,
which states that high school students engaging in extracurricular activities
may be subjected to mandatory drug tests by high schools,3 is perplexing.
Lindsay Earls, like many good students, had not been in trouble for drugs
previously, in fact, Earls was a member of the marching band, the show choir,
the Academic Team, and National Honor Society.4 However, because of the
Supreme Court’s concern regarding U.S. high schools and the use of the
“special needs” doctrine, good students like Earls can be made to submit to
drug testing without individualized suspicion, even though these types of
students are the least likely to be using drugs.5 The decision to allow such
testing is even more problematic because the Supreme Court ignored its
already confusing special needs precedent in order to hold in such a way, and

1. Jacquelynne S. Eccles & Bonnie L. Barber, Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball,
or Marching Band: What Kind of Extracurricular Involvement Matters?, 14 JOURNAL OF
ADOLESCENT RESEARCH 10, 11 (1999).
2. See id.; Jeanne E. Jenkins, The Influence of Peer Affiliation and Student Activities on
Adolescent Drug Involvement, 31 (122) ADOLESCENCE 297, 304 (1996); Lee Shilts, The
Relationship of Early Adolescent Substance Use to Extracurricular Activities, Peer Influence, and
Personal Attitudes, 26 (103) ADOLESCENCE 613, 614-15 (1991).
3. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct.
2559 (2002).
4. Id. at 2563.
5. See Eccles & Barber, supra note 1, at 15-25.
559
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the logic used in Earls inevitably leads to the allowance of mandatory drug
tests for all high school students.
This note will focus on the special needs doctrine and how it has been, is,
and could be applied to high school student drug testing. Section II will focus
on the origins of the special needs doctrine, including some discussion of nonschool based applications. Section III will then discuss Earls, keeping an eye
towards the applicable precedent. Section IV will discuss the state of student
drug testing after Earls and some surrounding legal areas open to debate, while
Section V will be the conclusion.
II. HISTORY OF SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment states that “people [are] to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”6 Thus, only reasonable searches are allowed under the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment extends the application of the
So, all Fourth
Fourth Amendment to state and local governments.7
Amendment inquiries must first decide whether the government actor is indeed
initiating a “search,” and then decide whether this “search” is “reasonable.”8
The Fourth Amendment only protects against “searches” if the “searched”
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy.9 Typically, “reasonable
searches” are accompanied by probable cause or a warrant and individualized
suspicion, and limited to criminal investigations.10
A.

T.L.O. and the Inception of the Special Needs Doctrine

A concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O. started using the term “special
needs” to describe a growing body of exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant or probable cause.11 The case involved two 14-year-old girls
6. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
7. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
8. Id.
9. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
10. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottonatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct.
2559, 2564 (2002); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997); Skinner v Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
11. Matthew A. Pring, The Death of a Doctrine: The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and
Random Suspicionless Urine Drug Tests Eroding the “Special Needs Doctrine,” 79 DENV. U. L.
REV. 457, 463 (2002). The term “special needs” grew out of Justice Brennan’s opinion that
concurred in part and dissented in part, in which he said, “[S]ome special governmental interest
beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to justify the categorical exception
to the warrant requirement,” and “special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant
requirement flow from ‘exigency.’” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 356 (emphasis original). This
phraseology was simply shortened to the “special needs” exception in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
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suspected by a teacher of smoking, one of whom was T.L.O.12 The two girls
were sent down to a principal’s office, and the principal demanded to view the
contents of T.L.O.’s purse.13 Upon a cursory examination, he found cigarettes
and cigarette rolling papers which the principal knew were connected to
marijuana use.14 The principal thus searched her whole purse, and found
marijuana and related materials.15 T.L.O. contended that the search of her
purse violated the Fourth Amendment, and while the trial court agreed that
although the Fourth Amendment applied to her situation, the search was
reasonable.16 The appellate court vacated this judgment, but the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the idea that certain “reasonable” circumstances allow
for warrantless searches.17 Regardless, the New Jersey Supreme Court
believed that the circumstances were not “reasonable” in this case, and so held
the search of T.L.O.’s purse violated the Fourth Amendment.18
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment should
protect high school students, the school needed some degree of autonomous
discretion in searching students in order to maintain discipline.19 Thus, the
Court sought to strike a balance between these two concerns, and dismissed
any potential requirement of the school to obtain either a warrant or probable
cause.20 The Court decided that the test for the legality of a search should be a
“reasonableness” standard, based on “whether the action was justified at its
inception,” and “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.”21 In applying this standard, the
Court held that the principal’s search was valid, as he initially had a reasonable
basis to search for cigarettes because of the report from the teacher, and a
reasonable basis to further search the purse when he discovered the rolling
papers.22 However, Justice Brennan thought the Court sacrificed too much
individual freedom when crafting this test, especially because of the standard’s
amorphous characteristics.23
12. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 329.
17. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330-31.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 337-39.
20. Id. at 340-41.
21. Id. at 341.
22. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343-45.
23. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan did
not believe that the “reasonableness” standard to be developed enough for use, especially since he
believed the test to be unnecessary. Id. at 354. Justice Brennan stated, “The Warrant Clause is
something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit,” so a
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The Court in T.L.O. told schools that searching students without a warrant
or probable cause did not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment.
However, “reasonableness” under the circumstances was required, and
individualized suspicion had not yet been deemed unnecessary. The Court did
not rule on the individualized suspicion requirement to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, as it was not necessary in T.L.O.24
B.

Vernonia and the Elimination of Individualized Suspicion in Schools

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton further analyzed the special needs
doctrine in the context of high schools.25 However, because the Court decided
the case based on a specific fact scenario, 26 the circumstances of this decision
must be analyzed. The schools in the Vernonia district had recently been
victim to a large increase of drug use and insubordination regarding this new
drug use.27 The District Court found that student athletes were the leaders of
this new “drug culture.”28 Vernonia brought specific evidence and expert
testimony regarding the danger that drug use posed to student athletes.29 The
school district had employed other strategies to combat the new drug
program.30 The final plan of action would consist of an adult monitor that
would accompany the student during a urine sample, which would be sent to
an outside party that would not know the identity of the student.31 This outside
party would reveal only information regarding the relevant drugs.32 Thus, only
a class of students engaging in a dangerous activity and known to be leaders of
a current drug use and behavioral problem were subject to a drug test, which
would be taken in a discreet and protective manner.33
The Court’s analysis noted that the action by Vernonia constituted a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.34 However, the Court reiterated its

balancing test is inappropriate. Id. at 356. Further, he believed no precedent existed for such a
“balancing test” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 358.
24. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n. 8 (The Court noted that certain situations had allowed for the
government to ignore the individualized suspicion requirement, but only when there were “‘other
safeguards’ available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to the discretion of the officer in the field.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654-55 (1979)).
25. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S 646 (1995).
26. Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 648-49.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 649.
31. Id. at 650.
32. Id. at 650-51.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 652.
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position from T.L.O., that a warrant or probable cause is not necessary for a
search to be legal, if it is based on reasonableness and “special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable.”35 The Court also noted that individualized
suspicion had not been needed in other “special needs” contexts such as
railroad personnel, federal customs officers, and border patrol officers.36
While noting this, the majority did not attempt to explain why the
individualized suspicion requirement should be eliminated in the public school
context.37 However, the Court fashioned a three part test to determine the
Constitutionality of Vernonia’s searches which included: 1) the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, 2) the character of the
intrusion, and 3) the immediacy of the governmental concern giving cause for
the search.38
In applying this three-part test, the Court looked to the nature of the
privacy interest that the search intrudes upon.39 The Court, though nominally
rejecting the notion that school teachers and administrators have full parental
power over students, disregarded the general characterization of the student35. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653.
36. See id. at 653-54 (For railroad personnel, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989), for customs officers, see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989), and for border patrol officers, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
Skinner and Von Raab were companion cases that served to eliminate the individualized
suspicion requirement from “special needs” situations. The Court in Skinner found that in the
context of drug testing railroad workers, “[I]t would be unrealistic, and inimical to the
Government’s goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation, to require a showing of individualized
suspicion in these circumstances.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631. Thus, the Court places the wagon
before the horse by stating because we have already decided that the government’s goal is
important and that individualized suspicion requirements would make this goal harder to achieve,
the individual suspicion requirement is not needed. No discussion is given regarding the
importance of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. In Von Raab,
the Court uses a similar argument, claiming that the government’s interest in fighting the war on
drugs is more valued than the Fourth Amendment rights of the customs workers. See Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 672-75. Martinez-Fuerte, though not technically a “special needs” case, as it was
decided in 1976, held that the governmental interest of preventing illegal aliens from crossing
into the U.S. warranted some abridgment of Fourth Amendment rights. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 554-59. Thus, up to this point in “special needs” jurisprudence, governmental needs win
the utilitarian balancing contest with a person seeking to government to obtain individualized
suspicion before a search.
37. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653-54. Justice O’Conner makes a powerful argument
in support of retaining the individualized suspicion requirement in her dissent. She claims that it
is not for judges to decide Fourth Amendment cases according to public policy concerns and that
the Court ignores the fact that suspicionless searches have generally been considered per se
unreasonable. Id. at 667-68 (O’Conner, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 654, 658, 660.
39. Id. at 654.
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school relationship from T.L.O. and instead emphasized the “custodial and
tutelary” nature of the supervision that schools exercise over students.40 This
emphasis included noting that students are subjected to physicals “for their
own good and that of their classmates.”41 Thus, students have a limited
expectation of privacy in schools.42 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted
that student athletes have even a lesser expectation of privacy than nonathletes, as they require public showering, dressing and undressing, placing
themselves in the public light by voluntarily “go[ing] out for the team,” and
agreeing to a stricter set of rules of conduct requiring grades and dress.43 The
Court thus concluded that student-athletes are akin to a “closely regulated
industry” and should expect to have more intrusions upon their privacy,
meaning that any expectation of privacy is less reasonable and it becomes
easier for them to be “searched” under the Fourth Amendment. 44
The second factor the Court considered was the character of the
intrusion.45 In urine tests, the degree of intrusion is measured by the manner of
collection.46 Since the conditions of the Vernonia drug test were similar to
those typical in a public restroom, the intrusion of privacy is minimal.47 Also,
the intrusions is minimal since the test demonstrates only a limited type of
information and the records are released to as few people as possible and not
turned over to law enforcement agencies.48
The school district’s drug testing system contained one controversial
element, namely requiring the disclosure of taking any prescription medication
in advance.49 However, the Court looked to other precedent such as Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, and decided that the mandatory disclosure of
40. Id. at 655-56. (In T.L.O., the Court noted many freedoms of the students and emphasized
the school’s lack of parental power over them, while in Vernonia, Justice Scalia only mentions
T.L.O. factors that support this reevaluation of the student-school relationship. The factors
supporting the students’ expectation of privacy from T.L.O. left out by the Court include the fact
that compulsory education laws are not “consonant” with school officials acting as parents over
the children, that children should not have the same standing as criminals according to the Fourth
Amendment, that students have a legitimate need to maintain certain personal items for use
during school and after school, and many students bring personal and protected items such as
photographs, letters, and diaries to school. Id.; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-40.).
41. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 656.
42. Id. at 657.
43. Id.
44. Id. The phrase “closely regulated industry” was applied in Skinner, and factored into the
balancing test of the special needs doctrine by demonstrating a lesser expectation of privacy.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
45. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 658.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 659.
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current prescription medication is not unreasonable, and holds that this element
does not make the test too intrusive.50 Thus, “the invasion of privacy was not
significant.”51
The third prong of the analysis was the nature of the governmental concern
at issue. Interestingly enough, the Court rejected the standard of a
“compelling” interest, instead using an “important enough” standard to justify
the search.52 At this point Scalia listed the ill effects of drug use by high
school students including the ease of addiction for younger people, greater
susceptibility to impairment, and the cascade effects that drug use has on a
school environment.53 Scalia also noted that student athletes have a particular
risk of physical injury when drug use is combined with athletic activity.54 The
fact that the drug-testing program targeted only a class labeled “leaders of the
drug culture” and “role model[s]” had particular import for the Court, as the
drug test then narrowly targeted individuals largely responsible for the
problem.55 Thus, the contextual situation of the student athletes as a primary
cause for the drug problem led the Court to find that the nature of the
governmental interest is important enough to warrant a search.56
Since the Court determined that student athletes have a decreased
expectation of privacy, the search employed by the school was relatively
unobtrusive, and the need severe, the Court held that Vernonia’s drug testing
program as reasonable and Constitutional.57 However, the Court did so based
on a fact specific inquiry, as the Court stated, “[w]e caution against the
assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional
muster in other contexts.”58 The main reason the Court allowed the drug
testing was because of the newly-defined role of the student-school

50. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 659-60. Skinner stated that disclosure of medical
records was not a “significant invasion of privacy.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626, n. 7. However, the
holding in Von Raab had deemed important the notion that such disclosure of medical records
would only be required for those testing positive in the test. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73, n. 2.
Thus, the Court does not require drug-testing to be accomplished in the least invasive means.
51. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 659-60.
52. Id. at 661. (emphasis in original). I say “interestingly enough” because the Court had just
relied on Skinner and Von Raab as precedents, and now rejects the standard used by those
precedents. Id.
53. Id. at 661-62.
54. Id. (Drugs pose an additional threat to student athletes because the impairment of
judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening perception of pain have greater acuity of affect
when engaged in athletic activity.).
55. Id. at 662-63.
56. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 664-65.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 665.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

566

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:559

relationship, again noting the school’s roles as “guardian and tutor.”59
Additionally, the Court noted that the school oftentimes acts in loco parentis,
or in the place of the parent.60 In some situations these roles, under Vernonia,
give a school district the ability to engage in suspicionless searches under the
special needs doctrine to student athletes. Once the Court construed the
relationship between student and school in this manner, students lost a great
deal of their “reasonable expectations of privacy,” meaning that lesser
governmental interests can now override students’ Fourth Amendment
protections under the special needs doctrine. However, this interpretation still
had to be qualified by the context of the situation.61
Justice Ginsburg, in concurring, stated, “I comprehend the Court’s opinion
as reserving the question whether [a district may] . . . constitutionally . . .
impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in
team sports, but on all students required to attend school,” as “[t]he Court
constantly observes that the School District’s drug-testing policy applies only
to students who voluntarily participate in interscholastic athletics.”62 Thus,
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence echoed the opinion written by Justice Scalia by
emphasizing the fact-intensive basis upon which the decision was made. After
Vernonia, despite Justice O’Conner’s convincing argument to the contrary,63
school districts no longer needed individualized suspicion to mandate students

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Nathan Roberts & Richard Fossey, Random Drug Testing of Students: Where Will
the Line be Drawn?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 191, 196 (2002) (listing the nature of sports and
documented use of drugs by athletes as factors of the Court’s analysis in Vernonia); Neal H.
Hutchens, Commentary, Suspicionless Drug Testing: The Tuition for Attending Public School?,
53 ALA. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2002) (“While the Court in Vernonia considered a number of issues,
the decision left unclear the specific weight the Court afforded to each factor. . . . In other
circumstances, students involved in extracurricular activities, including athletics, may actually
demonstrate less of a disposition to engage in drug use then the rest of the student population.”).
62. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 666, (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg
notices that the fact that the students were athletes affected the three-prong approach because of
the reduced expectation of privacy, closer school regulation, and the additional risk of physical
injury.).
63. Id. at 666-86, (O’Conner, J., dissenting). Justice O’Conner, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, wrote that individualized suspicion requirements protect against governmental
intrusions by giving the individual some means of preventing the circumstances that lead to the
search, and that to eliminate this requirement is an affront to liberty. Id. at 667. Justice O’Conner
also argues that such large policy based decisions are not for the judiciary to make, and that large,
suspicionless searches are typically per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless
there are unique circumstances that would render suspicion-based testing ineffectual. Id. at 66768.
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to submit to Fourth Amendment searches if the context of the search was
strong enough to mandate a special need.64
C. The “Special Needs” Doctrine Applied to other Contexts
“Special needs” have been demonstrated in non-school circumstances.65
As the application of the doctrine turns on the context, a brief survey of
important special needs cases in other contexts will be informative. In a case
in which a public employee’s office was searched, O’Conner v. Ortega, the
Court upheld the search under the special needs doctrine, and noted that such
searches may be undertaken as long as there are some “reasonable grounds”
that the search will discover misconduct.66 Another case, Griffin v. Wisconsin,
held that special needs are present when the police search the home of a
probationer.67 The Court compared a probationer and a probation officer to a
child and a parent, and noted that the probation officer is charged with
protecting the public interest.68
The Court’s special needs jurisprudence turned an important corner in the
context of the companion cases of Skinner and Treasury Employees v. Von
Raab, which dealt with railroad workers and customs officers, respectively.69
These cases supplied the Court with contexts suitable to eliminate an
individualized suspicion requirement within the special needs doctrine. In
Skinner, the Court dealt with a rule that mandated drug testing to railroad

64. Id. at 664-65.
65. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In the
first Supreme Court case involving special needs after T.L.O., O’Conner v. Ortega, a plurality
opinion held that the legitimate expectation of privacy by a public employee is outweighed by the
public employer’s interest of running the workplace. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 71924 (1987) (plurality opinion). The employee on this particular case was barred from his office
because of sexual harassment allegations filed against him. His office was searched, and the
search yielded such items as a Valentine’s Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry. He had
been the only person to use that office for 17 years. Id. at 712-13, 718. In holding that a special
need existed, the Court stated that the government’s interest was strong, as public employees
perform many services on which the public depends, and it would be too burdensome for
employers to acquire a warrant before searching the office of the employee. Id. at 722-23. The
Court stated, “public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the
consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can
be severe.” Id. at 724.
66. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 726.
67. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880 (only one dissenting judge).
68. Id. at 876-77 (In “such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the warrant
requirement,” and allow for the special needs exception to control.). It also seemed important to
the Court that probationers are within “criminal sanctions” and should expect less privacy. Id. at
873-74.
69. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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workers involved in certain railroad accidents, or allowed the employer to
perform a drug test if the employee is suspected of on-the-job drug use.70 No
warrant or individualized suspicion other than a “reasonable basis” was
required under the rule. 71 However, the Court applied a utilitarian balancing
test and determined that the governmental needs of deterring and detecting
drug use within the railroad industry outweighed the individual expectation of
privacy of the employees against a urine test.72 The fact that a drug problem
existed made this outcome easier to arrive at than it would have been.73
However, there was no such drug problem within the fact scenario in Von
Raab. In that case, the United States Customs Service enacted a plan to
conduct drug tests for all those who either applied for or occupied certain
positions, even though the Commissioner believed that “[c]ustoms is largely
drug-free” and there had not been a showing that any U.S. customs officers had
been using drugs.74 However, the Court found a special needs exception to
exist here and allowed the test, due to the strong governmental interest of
monitoring those people in positions that interdict illegal drugs.75 As “drug
abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting society today,” the
Court believed that the government’s interest in detecting drug use was
compelling, and more important than the worker’s expectation of privacy.76
Thus, the utilitarian approach of the “special needs” exception to the warrant
requirement and individualized suspicion now extended to allow governmental
interests to look for and prevent problems that had not yet occurred, because
the potential harm could be great.77
Justice Marshall declared that the Court should not use utilitarian
balancing acts to justify suspicionless drug testing in his dissent in Skinner.78
He also argued that the Court ignored the fact that the Fourth Amendment was
enacted in order to prevent such utilitarian balancing.79 He stated that times of
crises are the times when the Fourth Amendment protections are most needed
70. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609-11.
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id. at 634.
73. Id. at 608 (as a result of drug use, 34 fatalities, 66 injuries, and $28 million of property
damage occurred).
74. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
75. Id. at 679.
76. Id. at 674-75. The Court compares the situation of detecting U.S. customs officers to
searching for explosives on planes, border checkpoints searches, and housing code inspections,
all of which do not require a warrant. Id. at 674-75, n. 3.
77. See id.; see also Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Comment, Shedding Their Rights: The
Fourth Amendment and Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public School Students Participating in
Extracurricular Activities, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 951, 961-62 (2002).
78. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 635-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and too often ignored, and the war on drugs is no exception.80 Justice Marshall
found it relevant that all five special needs cases up to that point have found a
strong governmental interest overriding an individual’s or class of individuals’
privacy interest and “ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.”81 Also of interest, he stated that a “majority of this Court, swept
away by society’s obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs, today
succumbs to the popular pressures . . . [to] bend time-honored and textually
based principles of the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to ensure that the
Government has a strong and individualized justification when it seeks to
invade an individual’s privacy.”82
After Vernonia, the special needs doctrine developed in a different way, as
the Court began to reject the application of the special needs exception. In
Chandler v. Miller, the Court for the first time rejected applying the special
needs exception and held a search to violate the Fourth Amendment.83 Writing
for an 8-1 majority, Justice Ginsburg found no special need regarding
Georgia’s plan to administer drug tests to political candidates running for high
offices.84 The Court emphasized that in order to overcome an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right without individualized suspicion, the government’s
interest must be “substantial—important enough to override the individual’s
acknowledged privacy interest.”85 In an attempt to differentiate between the
current case and Von Raab, which was similar in that there was no drug
problem, the Court noted that difference between the two cases was because of
the unique context present in Von Raab.86 In Chandler, safety was not at issue,
and in Von Raab typical law enforcement techniques would have been less
effective at discovering a drug problem.87 Chief Justice Rehnquist, the only

80. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall points out that Fourth Amendment rights
were abridged during the World War II relocation- camp cases, the Red Scare McCarthyism
subversion cases, and others.).
81. Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 654-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall quotes Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in support of his position: “[G]reat cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts judgment . . . [which] before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.” (quoting from Northern Securities Co. v.
U.S. 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (J. Holmes, dissenting)).).
83. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
84. Id. at 309.
85. Id. at 318. Georgia had no problem with drug use among high-ranking politicians, and
the Court was persuaded by the fact that normal law enforcement techniques should be adequate
to discover drug use among prominent individuals. Id. at 318-20.
86. Id. at 321 (The Court stated, “Hardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless
searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique context.”).
87. See id. at 321-22.
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dissenting Justice, did not persuade the Court to support his version of what
constitutes a special need. His test was simply to determine if the government
had a legitimate purpose other than law enforcement.88
The Court also rejected the use of the special needs exception in the
context of traffic stops in City of Indianapolis v. Edmund.89 The City’s search
involved highway checkpoints at which the motorist would be stopped and
sniffed for drugs by a narcotics detection dog.90 The Court again noted that the
government must have a substantial or important need to overcome Fourth
Amendment rights in this matter, as the context of the situation did not merit so
drastic a measure.91 The Court stated that Fourth Amendment rights are
important, even in the face of an important social problem: “[t]here is no doubt
that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude . . .
[b]ut the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue their
purpose.”92 Thus, even if the governmental need is substantial, the method of
the search cannot abridge Fourth Amendment rights in such an expansive
manner.
The final case decided by the Supreme Court before Earls regarding the
special needs exception was Ferguson v. City of Charleston, which also found
no special need by a 6-3 vote.93 The context in question dealt with hospitals
checking pregnant and delivering women for cocaine use.94 The Court pointed
out that this test was more invasive than previous tests,95 and found this to
violate the pregnant women’s reasonable expectations.96 Also, the Fourth
88. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
89. City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. at 32, 48 (2000).
90. Id. at 34-36.
91. Id. at 42-43. Traffic stops were allowed in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976), because of the location of the search, as the context of the U.S.-Mexico border
warranted a search. Also, this case is different than Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990)(in which sobriety checks were upheld because of the significant danger that
intoxicated drivers pose to the public, whereas simply transporting narcotics does not pose this
immediate danger.).
92. Edmund, 531 U.S. at 42.
93. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). It should be pointed out that after
Vernonia, Chief Justice Rehnquist has never voted to deny the application of the special needs
exception, and that Justices Scalia and Thomas have only done so in Chandler. Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
94. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-73 (Hospitals were to “identify/assist pregnant patients
suspected of drug use.” If cocaine was found, the woman could be charged with possession or
even distribution, as the fetus would be receiving the cocaine.).
95. Id. at 78. (The test was intrusive because the same test yielded information relevant both
to cocaine use but also the pregnancy.).
96. Id.
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Amendment acted to disqualify this search because the results were to be used
in law enforcement purposes, which is barred in all circumstances except in the
odd case of criminals on probation.97 The Court analyzed the nature of the
special need claimed by the state via “close review,” and decided that because
of the law enforcement factor, there was no special need even if the women
were to get substance abuse treatment after being discovered. 98
D. An Analysis of the Special Needs Precedent Leading to Earls
After reviewing the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the special needs
doctrine, an important conclusion to reach is that the doctrine is fact specific.
The Court does not routinely focus on the same elements of the balancing test
between the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against the
government’s interest in conducting the search. Typically, the Court’s everchanging method of applying the special needs test determines the result, as
when the Court focuses on utilitarian principles a special need tends to be
found, while when the Court focuses on individual rights the tendency is to the
opposite.99 T.L.O., Vernonia, Skinner, and Von Raab, all cases that allowed
special needs, focused on utilitarian principles. In T.L.O., searches were
allowed without probable cause not because the children were considered
lesser citizens, but because of the need for the administration to efficiently run
the school.100 Although the Vernonia Court did speak of students as lesser
citizens than those of majority, the citing of large amounts of psychiatric and
medical journals and the Court’s own broad language betrayed the utilitarian
basis for the Court’s decision.101 The fact that the Court eliminated any
individualized suspicion requirement for “searches” also demonstrates that the
Court focused on utilitarian principles over individual rights. Similarly, the
Court in the companion cases of Skinner and Von Raab also focused on the
utilitarian purposes of fighting the war on drugs and making railroads safe,
dismissing the individual rights concerns of the workers because their jobs
fulfill a utilitarian value.102 Additionally, the Chandler Court did not speak

97. Id. at 79-81, n.15.
98. Id. at 81-84. The Court states that the special needs category is “closely guarded.” Id. at
84.
99. The one exception to this was Griffin, which allowed the search of a probationer via a 81 decision, which was based on a regulatory special need governing probation, and as such the
decision was not based on utilitarian or individual rights principles. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
100. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338-42 (1985).
101. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 661-62 (1995).
102. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989); Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 671-72 (1989) (in Skinner, the railroad workers had a
lesser expectation of privacy because of the danger inherent in railroad operation, while in Von
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particularly on any individual rights, and looked primarily on utilitarian
principles.103 However, no special need was found because of a great lack of
any utilitarian arguments to support the drug testing of potential candidates for
office.104 No individual rights argument needed to be made.105
Since Chandler, the Court emphasized individual rights, giving little
concern to perhaps important utilitarian concerns. For example in Edmund, the
searching of cars to look for narcotics did not qualify as a special need, as this
search could act to get around the typical rights of a criminal defendant, even
though the benefits to the public generally could have been substantial.106
Similarly, the Court struck down searches of certain pregnant women for drug
use in Ferguson even though law enforcement was not the primary purpose of
the law and important interest of protecting young children from drug related
abuse.107
Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, when the Court placed emphasis on
utilitarian arguments, a special need was typically found, while no special need
was found when the focus was on individual rights. However, other than the
timing of the cases, there was little that could predict what the Court would
emphasize with a broad rule. The Court would not focus on individual rights
only when law enforcement became involved, even though Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s suggestion would have saved the Court much reasoning.
Additionally, although the Court focused on utilitarian principles in Chandler,
the individual rights of the candidates for office prevailed in that case,
demonstrating that the Court still values all individual rights, and not just those
involved with the criminal justice system. Also, the Court did not always
apply utilitarian principles when the searches in question were directed against
drug use. In Von Raab, Vernonia, Edmund, and Ferguson, the cases most
directly dealing with the disciplining or preventing drug use, the Court
emphasized utilitarian principles twice and individual rights twice. Thus,
throughout special needs jurisprudence before Earls, a fact sensitive inquiry
was used in which it would not be possible for an observer to predict which
facts would be valued by the Court via any broadly based distinctions or
patterns.
III. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. EARLS

Raab, the customs officers were said to have a lesser expectation of privacy only because of their
duty to interdict illegal drugs).
103. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 317-20 (1997).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 31, 42-48 (2000).
107. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-85 (2001).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

A.

DRUG TESTING THOSE CRAZY CHESS CLUB KIDS

573

Factual Background

Since the Supreme Court has stated many times that the context of the
search is important in regards to special needs cases,108 an understanding of the
immediate case is necessary. In the small rural city of Tecumseh, Oklahoma,
the School District adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy
(Policy), which required all high school and junior high students to submit to
drug tests in order to participate in extracurricular activities.109 However, drug
tests have only been administered to students engaging in competitive
activities, including band, choir, athletics, cheerleading, and academic
teams.110 Drug tests are administered before participating in the activity, and
may be administered randomly or upon reasonable suspicion.111 The students
must undergo urinalysis, which is only designed to detect illegal drugs.112 The
School did not demonstrate any pervasive or increasing drug use among the
students, however some drug use was evident.113 The two students who
opposed the test are Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching
band, the Academic Team, and National Honor Society, and Daniel James,
who sought to participate in the Academic Team.114
B.

District Court
1. Holding

At the trial level, Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public
Sch. Dist., the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma upheld
the District’s drug testing policy.115 In doing so, the District Court used many
of the arguments that would later be used by the Supreme Court, and as such
will be detailed later.116 However, certain aspects of the District Court’s
analysis are worth exploring. When reading Vernonia, which the District
Court took to be as the controlling case,117 it repeatedly emphasized the factors

108. See supra Section II.
109. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2562-63.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2563.
112. Id. (The specific drugs the test can detect include amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine,
opiates, and barbituates.).
113. See id. (some evidence, but no “drug culture” or statistics demonstrating the breadth of
any drug problem).
114. Id.
115. Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d 1281, 1296
(W.D. Okla 2000) rev’d, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
116. See supra Section III(D).
117. See Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d 1281 (W.D.
Okla 2000) rev’d, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
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from Vernonia that cast schools as the guardians of the students and did not
mention factors supporting the argument that students have some legitimate
expectations of privacy in the school setting.118 Furthermore, although the
District Court acknowledged that the school district’s plan of drug testing
students in extracurricular activities did not effectively target students who use
drugs,119 the court dismissed this concern by stating, “[i]t can scarcely be
disputed that the drug problem among the student body is effectively addressed
by making sure that the large number of students participating in competitive,
extracurricular activities do not use drugs.”120 The court noted that Vernonia
did not require a match between the tested students and the drug users, and
noted that Skinner and Von Raab did not require such a match either.121
Additionally, the district’s policy was reasonable because the court concluded
that Vernonia should not be read to require an epidemic drug problem before
taking “peremptory measures,” as this would be at odds with the notion of
schools as guardians of the students.122
2. Analysis
Once the District Court decided that the school districts should act as the
guardians of the students without any qualifiers, the court’s holding is
pre-determined. Although this conclusion will be addressed in greater detail
below,123 it made it possible for the court to dismiss the “bad fit” between the
students who are more likely to use drugs and those that would have been
tested under the plan. If the students’ rights are not a concern, and the school
is viewed as a parent or guardian, it becomes easy to search any student,
regardless of any low probability of drug use. Additionally, though the court
states that drug testing so many students will help with a drug problem, the
court overlooks the fact that the students included within the tests are the least
likely to use drugs,124 meaning there is a good argument to claim that the
policy will do little to ameliorate the drug problem in Tecumseh schools.
Furthermore, the district court relied on Skinner and Von Raab in supporting
the notion that the test need not target those likely to use drugs is in error, as
those cases dealt with professionals in “closely regulated industries,” not high
school students. From these arguments, the court allowed “peremptory
measures” and ignored the fact-specific analysis in Vernonia by drug testing
students engaged in extracurricular activity. Such “measures” could only be
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1287-90.
See id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1295, n 52.
See Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Sch. Dist., 115 F.Supp2d at 1285, 1288.
See supra Section III(D).
See e.g., Eccles & Barber, supra note 1 at 10, 11, 15-25.
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conceived of after determining that the school acts as a guardian over the
students, as that sort of abridgment of Fourth Amendment rights, searches
without suspicion and instead reason to believe the search for drugs will be
fruitless anyway, is blatantly unconstitutional in other contexts. Thus, the
district court’s immediate characterization of students led to its decision to
validate the testing.
C. Circuit Court
1. Holding
The Tenth Circuit also used Vernonia as the primary authority for deciding
the case.125 However, writing for a 2-1 majority, Circuit Judge Anderson and
the Tenth Circuit read Vernonia and the special needs doctrine differently, and
reversed the District Court.126 The Tenth Circuit relied on the specific factual
basis of Vernonia, and noted that the situation in Vernonia was quite different
than in Earls.127 While the drug problem in Vernonia was an epidemic, at
Earls’ high school, only two students out of 486 students involved in
extracurricular activities tested positive for drug use in the 1998-99 school
year, and both students were athletes.128 Similarly, in the 1999-2000 school
year, only one student out of 311 students tested positive, and that student was
an athlete as well.129 From these facts, the court concluded that the interest of
the school in continuing the drug testing program was “negligible.”130 When
applying the Vernonia test, the court reasoned that although students engaged
in extracurricular activities do have a lesser expectation of privacy than other
students, this expectation is not as low as that of student athletes.131 Further,
the court noted that students have constitutional rights, even though the school
assumes some guardianship roles.132 After agreeing with the trial court that the
character of the invasion is not great,133 the Tenth Circuit analyzed the nature
and immediacy prong of the Vernonia test. The court noted that many of the
facts that led to the consitutionality of the Vernonia search were missing in the
Earls context, as non-athletes do not have the same safety risks coupled with

125. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1270.
126. Id. at 1279.
127. Id. at 1272-73.
128. Id.
129. Id. (not surprisingly, the total amount of students engaged in extracurricular activities
dropped remarkably).
130. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1275.
131. Id. at 1276.
132. Id. at 1275.
133. Id. at 1276.
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drug use as do athletes, and there is no evidence of any role-model relationship
between the students tested in the current case.134
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that since students engaging in
extracurricular activities frequently have less supervision than students during
normal school hours, that the school has a need to use monitor them in this
fashion.135 The argument does not work, as students who are not in
extracurricular activities are less monitored than those still at school, meaning
that if this argument were allowed to prevail, then all students could be tested
regardless of any extra involvement.136 As the court did not find that the
matter was pressing upon the school, and the solution only abridged the rights
of students without fixing any problem, it invalidated the drug testing policy.137
The Tenth Circuit concluded that if there is no requirement forcing the school
to impose a program on an identifiable drug problem that will address a
sufficient number of students to actually redress its drug problem, school
districts would be able to effectively drug test all students, which would be
unconstitutional.138 The court stated an “epidemic” need not be shown, but
that there must be a problem and a solution that will act to solve that drug
problem.139
2. Dissent
Circuit Judge Ebel, though in agreement with the standard of law adopted
by the majority, disagreed with the way the facts of the case were applied.140
Throughout his dissent, he stated that the facts of this case were similar to
Vernonia, as he believed the problem in Vernonia to not be as bad as the
majority thought it was.141 Further, Ebel believed that students engaging in
extracurricular activity have a lesser expectation of privacy, as their activity is
voluntary and therefore they should anticipate more searches.142 Since he
considered drugs to be a relatively large problem, he analyzed the nature and
immediacy of the problem prong differently than did the majority.143 The
dissent also criticized the majority’s requirement that there must be some sort
of match between the problem and the solution, by noting that Vernonia never

134. Id. at 1276-78.
135. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1277.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1278.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1279-87 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting). He also believed drugs to be a more important problem than
did the majority. Id. at 1280.
142. Id. at 1283, 85 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1286 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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required a strict scrutiny analysis for special needs cases and that the “least
intrusive” means were not required in Vernonia.144 Thus, although Ebel insists
that drug testing all students just by their nature as students would be
unconstitutional,145 he does not mind drug testing a large sample of students
repeatedly found not to be using drugs, because of the importance afforded to
controlling drug use among students.
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit was right to assert that there should be a relationship
between the alleged problem and the proposed solution, which in this case
means that any drug testing program must target those students most likely to
use drugs or refrain from targeting students that were not using drugs.
Although the dissent argued that the Tenth Circuit used a strict scrutiny
approach rejected by the Supreme Court, the majority decided the case
correctly. As Vernonia depended heavily on a context and a rationale that
showed that the drug testing fit the problem, it became reasonable for the
Tenth Circuit to use the same analysis. Although neither court applied strict
scrutiny, both Vernonia and the Tenth Circuit applied some scrutiny, so it
looks more akin to an intermediate scrutiny standard. These courts both
admitted the possibility of drug testing, while making certain that
constitutional rights were not abridged without applying some real judicial
review to the drug-testing plan. The Tenth Circuit additionally was correct in
reaffirming that students do have constitutional rights within the school setting,
even though the school takes on some guardianship roles. As mentioned
below,146 simply characterizing all students as under the care of the school
without addressing the students’ legitimate expectation of privacy as described
in T.L.O. will eventually lead to allowing the drug testing of all students, which
is something both sides say would be unconstitutional.147
D. Supreme Court
1. Holding
Justice Thomas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the Tenth Circuit as
the Court held the drug testing policy to be within the special needs exception

144. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
145. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1286 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
146. See supra Section III(D).
147. See e.g. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatonie County v. Earls, 122
S.Ct 2559, 2466 (2002); Id. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 1286 (Ebel, J., dissenting);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
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of the Fourth Amendment.148 After stating that the Fourth Amendment
applies, “reasonableness” is the standard, and that warrants, probable cause,
and individualized suspicion are not needed if there are “special needs,” the
Court noted that special needs have been found in public schools before.149
Justice Thomas claimed that the Court did not “simply authorize all school
drug testing, but rather conducted a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on
the children’s Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”150 In doing so, the Court applies the same test used in
Vernonia,151 it just does so quite differently.
In undertaking the Vernonia test, the Court considered the nature of the
privacy interest allegedly compromised by the Policy.152 The Court considered
the public school’s responsibility for maintaining discipline, health and safety
standards, and requiring both vaccinations and physical examinations
important, emphasizing the notion of students as children while giving no
attention to factors that would enhance the expectation of privacy interests of
the students.153 The Court rejected the argument that the Vernonia holding
should be limited to student athletes, by stating that the distinction was not the
essential factor, and that any student in extracurricular activities also has a
decreased expectation of privacy as compared to other students.154 Thus, the

148. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564. It should be pointed out how the current makeup of the Court
typically view the special needs exception. Since and including Vernonia, the Chief Justice has
always found a special need exception in the cases before the Court, while Justices Scalia and
Thomas have found an exception in every case except Chandler. Justices O’Connor, Stevens, and
Souter have never found a special needs exception since Vernonia. Justice Ginsburg concurred in
Vernonia that there was a special need exception, but wrote to emphasize the limited nature of the
holding due to the facts. Otherwise, he has not found an exception. Justices Breyer and Kennedy
have only found special needs for Fourth Amendment searches within a public school context. It
would seem then that even though Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent in Earls, that the swing
votes for special needs cases are Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at
2559; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531
U.S. 31, 32 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist, 515 U.S. at 646.
149. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564-65; see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-77; Edmund, 531 U.S. at
36; Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652-53.
150. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565.
151. Id. The three part test includes the nature of the privacy interest compromised, the
character of the intrusion, and the nature of the government’s interest and how the government is
meeting those interests. Id. at 2565-67; see supra text accompanying note 38.
152. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565.
153. Id. This was similar to what the Court did in Vernonia, as it emphasized only those
factors that tend to show a decreased expectation of privacy, while it ignored the other factors
from T.L.O. favoring enhanced expectations of privacy. See supra Section II(B).
154. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565-66.
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Court considered the first prong satisfied if the student is a child under the care
of the school, and engages in an activity that is not required by the school.155
The Court also considered the character of the intrusion, and found the
character of the urinalysis test dictated by the policy to be relatively
unobtrusive.156 The Court points out, by citing Skinner, urinalysis is an
accepted measure even though the “excretory function [is] traditionally
shielded by great privacy.”157 Also, the information provided by the test is
kept by the school, can be viewed only by those who need to, and is not used
for law enforcement purposes.158 Thus, the Court finds the character of the
intrusion to be of minimal harm.
The Court also determined that the nature and immediacy of the
government’s concerns and the efficacy of the search fell in favor of the school
district.159 First and foremost, the Court stated the drug problem in the nation’s
high schools is growing, stating that “the nationwide drug epidemic makes the
war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”160 Thus, though no
particular findings aside from what could be isolated incidents were
demonstrated, the School District’s concerns over drugs merited the
abridgment of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.161 The Court denied
the argument that a pervasive drug problem was a requirement before the
government’s needs were considered important enough to warrant a drug test
by quoting Von Raab, which stated “drug abuse is one of the most serious
problems confronting our society today.”162 Justice Thomas also noted that
this will deter children from using drugs, and that schools should not have to
wait before drugs are present before searching for them.163 Next, the Court
rejected the argument that in Vernonia the fact that athletes were allowed to be
drug tested because of the additional safety concerns that surround sports, and
that Vernonia excluded the possibility of drug testing students engaged solely
in non-athletic extracurricular activities.164 After stating that no individualized

155. See id.
156. Id. at 2566-67.
157. Id at 2566.
158. Id. (This goes along with the precedents in Von Raab and Skinner.)
159. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2567.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2567-69.
162. Id. at 2567-68.
163. Id.
164. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2568-69. This argument is again wrong, as it uses the same line of
reasoning described in the first part of the Vernonia test. All factors were crucial in that case, and
it is not simply a matter of noting a student-school relationship and concluding a special need
exists. See supra Section II(B).
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suspicion is needed,165 the Court found no difficulty in drug-testing those
students not likely to use drugs, and in fact targeting those least likely to use
drugs, because of the “public school’s custodial responsibilities.”166 The
Court’s reasoning allows for a school to issue a drug-testing requirement to
those least likely to use drugs and still satisfy the nature and immediacy of the
government’s concern prong of the Vernonia test, based only on the
nationwide drug problem.
2. An Analysis of the Holding
In beginning the analysis, the majority’s failure to recognize the distinction
between student athletes and other students is without merit under the first
prong of the Vernonia test. In rejecting the claim that the Vernonia decision
depended on the factual context of the students as student athletes, Justice
Thomas pointed out the language in Vernonia that said, “legitimate privacy
interests are even less with regard to student athletes.”167 His statement was
supposed to show that all students have a lesser expectation of privacy at
school, and that student athletes have an even weaker expectation of privacy
than the other students, meaning that the fact that Vernonia students were
athletes was only supplemental to that case’s holding.168 However, that
argument does not follow, as the phrase “even less” does not necessarily imply
that the fact that the Vernonia students were athletes was superfluous to the
Court’s holding, as the threshold of a lessened expectation of privacy may not
have been reached in regards to other students.
Vernonia did not speak to this question, as that matter did not come before
the Court in that case. After considering the basic relationship between the
students and the school, the Vernonia Court concluded that “students within
the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of
the population generally.”169 However, after adding the additional factors of
student athletes into the calculus, the Court concluded that student-athletes are
akin to adults in a “closely regulated industry” and “have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”170 The Court
did not say that intrusions into privacy were allowed until the Court considered
the special status of student athletes.171 Reading Vernonia in such a manner
makes sense, because if Justice Thomas’ reading were to be correct, any
165. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2568-69. This was first decided in Skinner and Von Raab, and first
applied to schools in Vernonia. See supra Section II(B)-(C).
166. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2569.
167. Id. at 2565, n. 3. (emphasis original).
168. See id.
169. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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student would be subject to drug testing since all students are in the studentschool relationship. However, the Court has not stated this to be the case, and
in fact has stated that subjecting all students to drug tests “is not entirely
consonant with compulsory education laws.”172 Further, there would be no
need to consider the different contexts of athletic involvement, extracurricular
activity, or on-campus parking, if the determining factor of “reasonableness” is
the relationship between the student and the school. As courts do concern
themselves with these contexts,173 the Earls Court mischaracterized the privacy
interest prong of Vernonia and disregarded the proper reading of precedent.
The Court had ample foundation in the precedent for holding that the
character of the intrusion is acceptable. After Skinner and Von Raab,
urinalysis has always been held to be minimally intrusive.174 Also, since the
results of the drug test are not distributed to any law enforcement agency, they
do not have the same difficulties as did the searches in Edmund and Ferguson.
It appears that the majority decided character of the intrusion prong correctly
according to precedent.175
The Court’s argument regarding the third prong of the Vernonia suffers
from the same shortcomings that the first test does. By ignoring all related
context and focusing on a national drug problem when allowing drug testing
for students, the Court logically committed to allowing drug testing for all
students, which the Court has rejected.176 The Court ignored the context of
Vernonia, namely a recent drug problem had emerged in the school in
question, the fact that athletes are at a greater safety risk, and the status of
athletes as leaders of a “drug culture,” meaning they used more drugs and
served to spread their use. Focusing on “constitutionality of the program in the
context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities”177 at the expense of
the status of the students must logically lead to the allowance of drug-testing

172. Id. at 655.
173. See Bd. Of Educ. Of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottowatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.
Ct 2559 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison
School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) (students who drive to school must submit to a
suspicionless drug test).
174. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 660.
175. There is some disagreement among the Justices here, but a urinalysis test will frequently
pass this prong of the test. The dissent focuses on the fact that the test results were not as
protected as they should have been. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2574-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Also,
Justice Breyer noted some doubts about urinalysis tests being uninvasive. Id. at 2570-71 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
176. See Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“Had the Vernonia Court agreed
that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to test each student’s blood or
urine for drugs, the opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”).
177. Id. at 2569.
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all students, which the Court claims it must not do.178 Further, on a practical
level, any abridgment of the Fourth Amendment should be done so in a matter
that will best accomplish what it sets out to do. Students engaged in
extracurricular activity are least likely to use drugs,179 and so developing a
policy to test them just because they are involved in such activities seems illconceived and unnecessarily abridges the students’ rights. Additionally, the
Court misread Von Raab when it relies on it to allow drug testing among a
population that reported no problems of drug use. As noted above, drug tests
were allowed in Von Raab only because of the safety issues and public
consequences that could result for customs workers affected by drugs. 180 The
Court in Chandler noted that the Von Raab context was to be limited, “Von
Raab must be read in its unique context . . . . Customs workers . . . are
routinely exposed to the vast network of organized crime that is inextricably
tied to illegal drug use.”181 Some high school students do use drugs, but are
not involved in drugs to the extent of hunting down drug traffickers, and it
would seem that the “unique context” is not present in US high schools. Thus,
although the problem of high school drug use is pervasive,182 any drug-testing
rule that ignores the immediate context of the situation and is applied to those
least likely to use drugs where no pervasive drug problem has been
demonstrated, does not follow precedent and goes too far in abridging
students’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Furthermore, the Court’s rule will allow for bad policies to continue. As
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “[e]ven if students might be deterred
from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at least
as likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in
order to avoid detection of their drug use.”183 Since students who participate in
extracurricular activities are less than half as likely to use drugs, the school
may be pushing students away from a factor that will tend to eliminate some
drug use among students.184 Further, students who are pushed away from
178. See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 655; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336
(1985) (mandatory drug testing and compulsory education are not “consonant” with each other).
179. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Eccles & Barber, supra, note 1 at
15-25.
180. See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 (1989) (where preventing
drug use of US customs officials is akin to searching luggage for explosives at airports).
181. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
182. Earls, 122 S.Ct.. at 2567, n. 5.
183. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), see also supra, Section III(C)(1) (note
the decline of the number of students tested at Earls’ high school. Although they may just have
tested fewer students, it is possible the number of eligible students declined as more students
became “conscientious objectors.”).
184. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Tamara A. Dugan, Note, Putting the
Glee Club to the Test: Reconsidering Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students
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extracurricular activities by such drug testing requirements are then likely to
have more time and opportunity to use drugs.185 Thus, suspicionless drug
testing on students involved in extracurricular activities is poorly suited for
addressing drug use by adolescents, making the intrusion on their rights even
more needless.
3. Concurrence
Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s judgment, agreeing with the
Court’s application of Vernonia to Lindsay Earls’ contention, but with a
different emphasis.186 He characterized the drug problem as quite important
and pervasive, and cited numerous studies that relay statistics on drug use,
some economic impact of drug use, that the government’s activity regarding
the supply side of the drug problem has not been effective.187 He further stated

Participating in Extracurricular Activities, 28 J. LEGIS. 147, 178-79 (2002); see also Eccles &
Barber, supra note 1 at 1 (The authors conducted a longitudinal study that showed that students
involved in extracurricular activities are less likely to use drugs than other students, excepting that
athletes tend to drink more alcohol. Sixty-nine percent of the students polled were involved in
some kind of organized activity. Also, interesting, the questionnaire had the children select and
archetype drawn from the John Hughes movie, The Breakfast Club, namely the princess, the jock,
the brain, the basketcase, and the criminal. “Criminals” had the least amount of extracurricular
activities, and participated even less in them by their senior year. They were also the most likely
to drink alcohol, skip school, use drugs, and the least likely to like school. In contrast, the
“Brain” was the most likely to engage in academic clubs and volunteer work, and the least likely
to drink alcohol, skip school, use drugs, had the best grades, was most likely to attend college,
and liked school as much as the “princess” and the “jock.” “Princesses,” who oftentimes were
involved in the performing arts, were similar, but not as averse to risky behavior, to the “brain.”
The study also noted that athletes were more likely to go to college than other students, but they
engaged more often in drinking alcohol. However, this risky activity was thought not to be
“necessarily problematic” as the risky behavior takes place within the context of a group of highly
motivated and otherwise healthy students.); Jenkins, supra note 2 (students with high levels of
academic performance and extracurricular activity are less likely to use “gateway” and “hard”
drugs); Shilts, supra note 2, at 614-15 (drug abusers reported little involvement with
extracurricular activity, while students with high levels of extracurricular involvement used little
drugs and spent more time with their families).
185. See Dugan, supra note 184 at 178-79; Eccles & Barber, supra, note 1 at 11
(The authors [of studies detailing students’ involvement with extracurricular activities]
argued that constructive, organized activities would be a better use of the adolescents’
time for the following three reasons; (a) idle time is the devil’s playground—doing good
things with one’s time takes time away from opportunities to get involved in risky
activities; (b) one can learn good things while engaged in constructive activities—for
example, specific competencies and prosocial values and attitudes; and (c) involvement in
organized activity settings increases the possibility of establishing positive social supports
and networks.).
186. See Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2569 (Breyer, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 2567-70 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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that the schools, as actors with certain parental responsibilities, must find a
way to deal with the problem.188 Justice Breyer also discussed the policy at
issue, stating that taking urine samples should not necessarily be considered a
“negligible” invasion of privacy, but that individualized suspicion is not
needed in this context.189 Further, he believed that a good aspect of the
program in question was that it did not subject the entire school to drug testing,
and that there is still an option for the conscientious objector.190

188. Id.
189. Id. at 2570-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 2571 (Breyer J., concurring).
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4. An Analysis of the Concurrence
Justice Breyer devoted little of his concurrence to constitutional argument,
but instead used his concurrence to list problems the ills of drug use. This
emphasis demonstrates that once the schools are characterized as a type of
parental figure and drugs are considered to be a large problem, little legal
argument is needed to jump to a conclusion that a drug-detecting program is
constitutional. Although few would deny that the drug problem is bad, many
would contend that such problems do not warrant the dismissal of
constitutional protections so easily.191 The constitution was written to stop the
federal government from acting recklessly along the lines of popular opinion
when other important rights, such as privacy, are endangered.192 Justice
Breyer’s consideration of drug testing all students193 shows that the Court’s
current reading of Vernonia is dangerously close to allowing all students to be
drug testing based solely on school attendance. Also, he mischaracterizes the
importance of extracurricular activities for students when he states that a
student may opt out of them in order to avoid drug testing. Forgoing
extracurricular activities has serious implications for students socially,
physically, and academically, 194 which may be too great of a penalty for most
“conscientious” students to pay. This is especially true for students with
ambitions to go to college, as extracurricular involvement is a key factor in the
college admissions process.195 So, even if the government maintains the drug
testing program and only tests those students who submit to it, there is still
quite a bit of coercion being used on the students.
191. Linda Oshman, Comment, Public School Lessons: Setting Limits on Suspicionless Drug
Testing After Vernonia, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1341-42 (2001) (“[T]he Court also should end its
reliance on the special needs doctrine and return to individualized suspicion when evaluating
public school drug testing policies. The Supreme Court should give more than a passing nod to
the plain language of the Fourth Amendment.”).
192. See Justice Brandeis’ words from Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928), as was
quoted by Justice Ginsburg in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
(“[I]t is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.).
193. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
194. See Eccles & Barber, supra note 1 at 10-13.
195. See Rachel Hartigan Shea & David L. Marcus, Make Yourself a Winner: Insider
Strategies for Getting Into College, USNEWS.COM, 2002, at 1, at http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/edu/college/articles/brief/02cbstrategy.htm (last visited May 19, 2003) (a particular
dedication to a particular activity is now even recommended); Kaplan, Road to College (2003), at
http://www.kaptest.com/repository/templates/Lev5InitDroplet.jhtml?ProductId=&_lev5Parent=/w
ww/KapTest/docs/repository/content/College/Admissions/Road_to_College/Preparing (last visited May 14, 2003).
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4. Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Conner, and Souter,196
contended that the majority ignored the importance of context in regards to
special needs judgments and that the Court is misreading T.L.O. and
Vernonia.197 Justice Ginsburg stated that by overlooking the context of the
particular search and students in question and focusing solely on the school’s
responsibilities over the children, the majority’s logic applied to all students
and not just those that are involved in extracurricular activity.198 She wrote,
“[h]ad the Vernonia Court agreed that public school attendance, in and of
itself, permitted the State to test each student’s blood or urine for drugs, the
opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”199 The dissent, in order to
dispute the expectation of privacy prong from Vernonia, argued that
extracurricular activities are an integral part of the school’s educational
program and they cannot be said to be truly “voluntary.”200 She further argued
that the context of athletics is different than that of other extracurricular
activities, as there is no communal undress or any physical risk, and these
factors act to create a lesser expectation of privacy for athletes than other
students involved in extracurricular activity.201 Justice Ginsburg accused the
Court of failing to recognize this distinction, and noted that under T.L.O. “the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search.”202 The dissent also maintained that
a urine sampling is more invasive than the Court believes it is, and noted that
the information gleaned from the tests was not always aptly protected.203
Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority’s conclusion on the nature and
immediacy of the governmental interest prong of the Vernonia test.204 She
noted that the context between the school in Vernonia and the Earls school
were different in two regards, as the Vernonia school had a much larger drug
problem, and that its drug testing program tested the students using drugs.205
Opposed to Vernonia, the Earls school’s drug testing plan did not target the

196. Justice O’Conner wrote a short and separate dissent in which she was joined by Justice
Souter, which reaffirmed her dissenting position from Vernonia. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571
(O’Conner, J., dissenting).
197. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 257273(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 2573-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added in the Earls’ dissent)
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
203. Id. . at 2574-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2575 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2575-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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students who used drugs, and had to deal with a lesser drug problem.206 Thus,
the Vernonia context had a greater need and a plan that more appropriately
addressed that need, and so the nature and immediacy prong was satisfied in
Vernonia, but not in Earls.207 In this manner the dissent attacked the Court’s
holding on all three levels of the Vernonia balancing test.
In the second part of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg compared Lindsay
Earls’ situation to the context of Chandler, and argued that the Court should
have decided the matter along those lines.208 As in Chandler, where
mandatory drug tests of political candidates were declared unconstitutional,
there was no “concrete danger” and no action taken to appropriately advance a
“special need.”209 She also related the idea described by Justice Brandeis that
the government acts as a teacher, and that such drug testing measures that
actually accomplish little are powerful symbols that demonstrate that
constitutional freedoms and principles have little meaning.210 This is a
dangerous message to teach to today’s youth and tomorrow’s leaders.
5. An Analysis of the Dissent
Justice Ginsburg read Vernonia and the Earls context together correctly.
Although her attack on the second prong of the Vernonia balancing test (the
urine test) was a futile one, she is right to come to different conclusions
regarding the expectation of privacy and the immediacy of the government’s
need prongs. Vernonia, as recalled from above, dealt with a situation where a
rampant drug problem was spreading throughout the school that had its origins
with student athletes.211 In comparison, the school in Earls had a lesser drug
problem, and offered a solution that did not serve to help the situation and for
the most part subjected students to embarrassing tests needlessly.212
Additionally, the fact scenario in Earls had much in common with Chandler,
because although there was a small problem, it was not to the degree to require
broad testing of mostly innocent subjects. However, though the dissenting
judges were quick to attack the conclusion of the majority, they did not offer
another solution. Given that the judges of the majority consider drugs to be a
paramount problem worth sacrificing civil rights for,213 an alternative plan may

206. Id.
207. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2577-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 2578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. See supra Section II(B).
212. See supra Section III(A) (note again that a minute portion of those students tested proved
positive for drug use); supra Section III(C)(1).
213. See supra Section III(D), see also Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(Justice Breyer seemed concerned about the drug problem in his concurrence, and in his
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be needed to convince them to abandon the current direction of their
jurisprudence.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF EARLS AND THE DRUG TESTING OF STUDENTS
Though the Court has often stated that “schoolchildren do not shed their
constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse,”214 the Court’s
misreading of the special needs precedent in Earls almost makes that statement
untrue in regards to the Fourth Amendment. If the Court allows drug testing of
students because of their membership on the chess club, schools can craft any
drug testing program they want, as long as they find some minimal “volunteer”
basis for the program. Thus, students who drive their cars to school or smoke
on campus can almost certainly be tested, and even possibly students who
choose their own lockers, dress certain ways, or get a certain number of
disciplinary referrals. Such an expansion of drug testing could only occur if
the Vernonia test was applied out of context.
Given that the Court applies the special needs doctrine based on contextual
factors,215 a comparison of the context between Vernonia and Earls should
determine how the doctrine is applied. The two cases should have reached
different results under the proper reading of Vernonia.216 In Vernonia, the
school had a rapidly increasing drug problem, with a group of students who led
a “drug culture,” and a test that specifically applied to that same group.217
Additionally, drug use among student athletes poses more risk than to other
students, and athletes expect to abide by additional rules, for their own safety
and for fairness of competition concerns.218 Meanwhile, in Earls the situation
was quite different, as the drug problem in that case lacked the immediacy of
the Vernonia school, and the drug testing program did not target those
responsible for drug use, as only three tests out of 792 came back positive.219
Also, the students subjected to the Earls drug test did not have the same
lessened expectation of privacy as athletes, and drug use did not pose any more
of a risk to these students than any other student.220 Thus, the contexts of the

conclusion mentioned that although he did not know that the program would work, it was worth
trying. This suggests that he believed action to be required, and so authorized the drug test. If
there was an alternative to combat the drug problem that would be more “reasonable” under the
constitution, then Justice Breyer and the others may hold differently on this issue.).
214. See, e.g. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
215. See supra Section II(D).
216. See supra Section III.
217. See supra Section II(B).
218. Id.
219. See supra Section III.
220. Id.
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two cases differed significantly except for: 1) the subjects of the drug tests
were students who had at least minimally “volunteered,” and 2) there was at
least some drug use at each school. Since the majority in Earls still held that
the drug test was constitutional, it had to have misread or ignored all the other
factors considered in Vernonia. Such a reading poses a danger to students’
constitutional rights, since the Court’s acceptance of view of that the custodial
role of the school over the students is paramount means students who do not
“volunteer” for anything may soon be subjected to mandatory drug tests.
One reason for the Court’s behavior regarding this issue may be because of
the current perceptions of drugs and high schools. Courts consider the “war on
drugs” to be important, 221 and high schools have been increasingly looked
upon as places of danger after the wake of the Columbine shootings and
similar tragedies. Since the Columbine shootings, courts and school
administrators have been acting to take away and limit constitutional rights.222
Although these tragedies were awful, they are the exception rather than the
rule, as schools remain one of the safest places for children.223 Since schools
are safer than most give them credit for, it would be a mistake to abridge the
Fourth Amendment rights of all students because of a few extremely bad, but
highly publicized, apples. Although it is not possible to prove that the Court
decided Earls because of the concerns regarding drugs and high schools, if it
was true, it would be unfortunate that the Court let misperceptions and fear
cloud its judgment and sacrifice students’ Fourth Amendment rights as a result.
Or, to put it as Justice Marshall did in Skinner, the “majority of this Court,
swept away by society’s obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs,
today succumbs to the popular pressures . . . [to] bend time-honored and
textually based principles of the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to ensure
that the Government has a strong and individualized justification when it seeks
to invade an individual’s privacy.”224

221. See e.g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676-75 (1989); see also
Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839, 842 (2002).
222. Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000)
(Although this article speaks mostly to First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights can be
said to have followed a similar course after a comparison between Vernonia and Earls. Calvert
stated, “. . .[C]onstitutional rights currently are trampled on a routine basis in the nation’s public
schools, largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance, and self-preservation on the part of the
administrators. ).
223. Patrick Richard McKinney II, Note, On the School Board’s Hit List: Community
Involvement in Protecting the First and Fourth Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1323, 1344 (2001).
224. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 654-55 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
disssenting).
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Additionally, the Earls Court missed an opportunity to clarify the special
needs doctrine. Earls is unique within special needs jurisprudence in that it is
the first case that can draw on precedent from a similar context. No other pair
of special needs cases have contexts as similar as Earls and Vernonia, since
both cases involved the same “searchers” and “searchees,” such a similar type
of test, a similar motivation for testing, and closely related arguments between
the governmental interest and the individual’s expectation of privacy. The
context in Earls mirrors Vernonia in these respects, yet it is different enough
that it should warrant a different conclusion under the same analysis.225 Such
cases could help observers ascertain the meaning of the special needs doctrine.
However, instead of affirming the context-based approach used in Vernonia
that limited drug testing to student athletes, the Court changed the context by
redefining the relationship between the student and the school, leading to the
allowance of drug testing students as a class. By doing so, the Court has laid
the framework for a future in which all students may be forced to submit to
drug tests. The precedent set by Vernonia’s analysis did not inevitably lead to
the conclusion that all students are available for drug testing, and it is
unfortunate in regards to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the Court
decided to ignore its prior reasoning. Additionally, had the Court used the
same type of analysis used by Vernonia, some of the rationale behind special
needs decisions would have been more apparent, whereas now the doctrine is
perhaps more muddled than it already was.226
Furthermore, the Court’s decision leads to bad policy and is not realistic
concerning the current nature of U.S. high schools. The Earls decision drugtests students least likely to use drugs and may act to discourage students from
joining extracurricular activities that provide benefits for children.227 Studies
show that involvement in school-based leadership clubs, spirit activities, and
academic clubs increase the likelihood of the child being enrolled in college
full-time at age 21, and that all extracurricular involvement is correlated with
lesser illegal drug use.228 Students who engage in extracurricular activity

225. See supra Section IV.
226. See Krislen Nalani Chun, Note, Still Wondering After AllTthese Years: Ferguson v. City
of Charleston and the Supreme Court’s Lack of Guidance Over Drug Testing and the Special
Needs Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 797, 819 (2002) (this note concludes that the special needs
doctrine is a malleable one, and able to be bent the way a majority of justices decide that it should
be bent); Jason E. Yearout, Note, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
What’s a School District to Do?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 489, 523 (2002) (T.L.O. has been
decided for 16 years and the factors to be concluded in assessing “reasonableness under all the
circumstances” is still unknown in special needs jurisprudence. Meanwhile, different courts
emphasize different factors.).
227. See supra note 184.
228. See e.g., Eccles & Barber, supra note 1, at 15-25.
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associate themselves with more positively influencing peers and create more
positive activity-based identity formation.229 So not only was the Earls drug
test a bad fit regarding constitutional concerns, but it may serve to isolate
students from an influence that supports academic achievement and curbs a
desire for drug use. Additionally, school districts who use drug-testing policies
similar to that in Earls may find that certain students have a harder time getting
into college. Although extracurricular activities are in the strict sense
“voluntary,” there is extreme pressure on contemporary high school students to
engage in these activities.230 Students wishing to go to college usually need
some kind of extracurricular involvement,231 and so those students deterred
from joining clubs because of a desire for drug use or who are “conscientious
objectors” will find themselves at a disadvantage compared to other students
for admission into college. Thus, the price to pay by a “conscientious
objector” is quite high, meaning that because in the realistic sense
extracurricular involvement is not “voluntary,” and so the drug-testing schools
apply a high degree of coercion that is not acceptable considering the
mandatory nature of education. A policy that serves to discourage involvement
in extracurricular activity and views such activity as wholly “voluntary” is not
in congruence with contemporary U.S. high schools.
Given the problems of a Court that misapplies its precedent, a confusing
doctrine, and the creation of a bad policy, a new approach is needed. In certain
situations, drug testing may be warranted, but there needs to be a better system
to determine when drug testing is appropriate. The analysis of the Tenth
Circuit and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent can provide a starting point, as both
opinions read the precedent accurately.232 However, the special needs doctrine
requires further clarification. Perhaps courts could import an intermediate
scrutiny standard from First Amendment jurisprudence when applying the
special needs doctrine. Strict scrutiny would not work with special needs,
especially after individualized suspicion was eliminated in Vernonia, and a
rational basis test would allow for too much abridgment of Fourth Amendment
rights.
However, an intermediate scrutiny standard that forces some
reasonable fit between a drug testing policy and a pressing problem to be
addressed would serve to increase the stability of the doctrine and assure that
constitutional rights are not being set aside needlessly. For example, under this
test, the Earls drug testing policy would fail because the drug problem is not
pressing and that the test does not reasonably fit to remedy the purported

229.
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Id.
See supra Section III(D)(4).
See US News and World Report and Kaplan, supra note 195.
See supra Section III(C), (D)(4-5).
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problem. The Tenth Circuit applied a similar standard, and although that court
did not label the standard any kind of scrutiny, it achieved the same result.233
School districts may use other approaches besides mandatory drug testing
as well. One innovative school in Autauga County, Alabama used a voluntary
drug testing program instead of a mandatory one.234 Their Independent
Decision program received the cooperation of 55 local stores and restaurants,
and provided discounts to students who voluntarily submitted to drug tests and
tested clean for nicotine, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, PCP, and
marijuana.235 The system rewards students who choose to remain drug free.236
The program has been largely successful, as over half of the students volunteer
for the program, and questionnaires show that there has been a decrease in
drug use since the program was implemented.237 This kind of system has the
advantage of using the carrot instead of the stick, as it accomplishes the same
goal as that of mandatory drug testing, but the students will not feel punished
or lose confidence in the value of constitutional rights. Furthermore, discounts
at certain businesses may offer a compelling reason for students to remain
clean and some discounts may provide for more use of safe, public facilities,
such as a roller skating rink or a movie theater. The program also has an
advantage over mandatory drug testing programs such as the one found in
Earls in that all students can participate in the program and not just those who
are in extracurricular activities and least likely to use drugs. School boards
should consider this sort of truly voluntary program before embarking on a
mandatory drug testing program, even though the Supreme Court allows
expansive mandatory programs.
Although Earls allowed for a high amount of students to be drug tested,
certain factors may be raised that could avoid mandatory drug tests. One such
factor is that students over 18 may be able to avoid testing. Students of this
age are no longer children, and as such the school may no longer act in loco
parentis. As this factor played a critical role in the Earls decision allowing
mandatory drug tests, courts may not be able to justify a search according to
the redefined Vernonia test without the subject of the test being a “child.”
Another factor that could lead to the avoidance of the drug test involves certain
high school classes that require extracurricular activity. Courses such as band,
233. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d at 1278.
234. Office of National Drug Control Policy, What You Need to Know About Drug Testing in
Schools, (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
drug_testing.pdf (last visited May 20, 2003).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (in regards to eighth graders, nicotine use went down from 35.9 percent to 24.4
percent, while alcohol use went down from 39.9 to 30 percent, and marijuana use decreased from
18.5 to 11.8 percent).
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orchestra, choir, and others often require attendance to functions outside of
normal school hours in order to pass the class. Although these classes can be
avoided to a certain extent, meaning that these courses are in a way
“voluntary,” credit is given for these classes within a school’s mandatory
curriculum. Thus, a court may be persuaded that the school is using mandatory
drug tests on students who did not “volunteer” for anything, and thus fail the
Vernonia test. Undoubtedly, other factors may avoid the holding in Earls, but
such further analysis is outside the scope of this note.
V. CONCLUSION
The Earls decision ripped away Fourth Amendment protections needlessly
from students in the name of the war on drugs by allowing students least likely
to be drug users to be forced into mandatory drug testing. In doing so, the
Court failed to apply almost any level of scrutiny on student drug testing, and
laid the foundation for the drug-testing of all students by virtue only of high
school enrollment.238 Although attacking drug use amongst high school
students is an important societal goal, constitutional rights should not be
abridged because of inconvenience.
The Court also further confused the special needs doctrine. The only clear
standard in special need jurisprudence was that the context of the search was
critical in determining the validity of the search.239 However, after the Court’s
misapplication of the Vernonia test, the contextual aspects to be focused on are
no longer clear. Additionally, if the Court misread Vernonia in Earls because
of a perceived danger regarding U.S. high schools, then it missed a chance to
act as the rational voice amongst the prevailing forces acting to take away
rights of students.240
Although Earls was wrongly decided, other avenues for combating the
drug problem exist. Vernonia, read correctly, still allows for mandatory drug
testing of students in certain situations, and courts should apply an
intermediate scrutiny standard so that a balance can be struck between
protecting students from drugs and maintaining constitutional rights.241 School
districts can also enact truly “voluntary” drug testing programs to discourage
drug use while teaching children that constitutional rights are important and
not cast aside out of fear or because of the demands of a popular will acting on
their shock and confusion rather than their reason.242
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See supra Section III(D).
See supra Section II(D).
See Calvert, supra note 222, at 740.
See supra Section IV.
See Calvert, supra note 222, at 740; see supra Section IV.
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